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Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000400080027-2

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SIGINT COMMITTEE**

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

4 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

Subject: Proposed DCID 1/____, "Security Policy
Concerning Travel and Assignment of
Personnel with Access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information"

1. The SIGINT Committee has reviewed the proposed DCID and compared it with the corresponding sections of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR). Most members of the SIGINT Committee were concerned that the proposed DCID was not sufficiently restrictive since the inherent risk involved in hazardous activities is still sufficient to warrant special procedures for persons who have current or previous access to COMINT. (See Paragraph 3 for DIA/Navy view. (The Air Force Member reserves))

2. The Communications Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR) implement long-standing COMINT security agreements

The CISR provides for determination of an individual's depth of knowledge of the COMINT source, and establishes criteria for permitting (or denying) participation in hazardous activities. However, the section in the CISR on "Hazardous Activities" will be revised to clarify for the COMINT area those degrees of knowledgeability or access which must continue to be protected under the proposed DCI's security policy. We understand that the control manuals being revised by COMIREX will address similar concerns for imagery.

3. The DIA and Navy members support the proposed DCID prepared by the Security Committee. They believe the proposed SIGINT Committee revisions are not legally binding or enforceable in a uniform manner among the various categories of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. It is their view that the revisions suggested by the SIGINT Committee are closely aligned with current travel restriction

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
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policies in the CISR which have been so liberally waived over the past decade that they have become an unjustified administrative burden. These members also contend that the risk of compromising sensitive compartmented information is not demonstrably high despite numerous examples of duty and travel by indoctrinated individuals in countries designated by DCID 6/3 as risk areas.

4. Regarding the DIA and Navy view, the other members of the SIGINT Committee do not feel that the lack of legal enforceability (if indeed this is true) should bar the adoption of uniform travel restrictions for U.S. Government and contractor personnel. The Committee believes that most of the personnel to which the travel restrictions would apply are responsible individuals who would heed the rules without entertaining questions of their enforceability at law. The point is that even if the recommended travel restrictions are not legally enforceable, they are not illegal and general compliance therewith will diminish by some degree the risk of sensitive intelligence losses. The DIA/Navy members have mentioned the unjustified administrative burden associated with travel restriction policies. There is no doubt that the proper administration of the travel restriction policy will entail some cost, but this cost is believed affordable when the alternative and consequent risks are considered.

5. In conclusion, it is recommended that the attached DCID with the proposed revisions as embodying minimum standards for the community be promulgated.



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